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Pharmaceutical Companies, University Researchers, 
and the NIH through the Drug Repurposing  
Project at NCATS 
Brian F. Yagi

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The drug discovery process is long, expensive, and prone to 
failure. The average cost of developing an approved drug is 
increasing exponentially.
1
 Exacerbating the problem is the fact that, 
instead of being translated into medical therapies, basic scientific 
discoveries are languishing without further development. This 
phenomenon, known as the “Valley of Death,” has become a concern 
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
2
 which is the main funder 
of biomedical research in the United States.
3
 In an attempt to build 
bridges across the Valley of Death, the NIH created the National 
Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) in December 
2011.
4
 NCATS’ first project was the Discovering New Therapeutic 
Uses for Existing Molecules Program (the “Repurposing Project”).5 
 
   J.D. (2014), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. The author would like 
to thank Prof. Kevin Emerson Collins for helpful discussion during the drafting process, Dr. 
Francis Collins for access to and permission to use materials as references in this Note, and the 
Journal editorial staff for their excellent work in editing this Note. All mistakes are my own. 
 1. See Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Biomedical R&D Efficiency, 11 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 192 (2012). 
 2. See Francis S. Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time is Right, 3 SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1 (2011). 
 3. About NIH, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://nih.gov/about/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 4. NIH Establishes National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, NAT’L INST. 
HEALTH (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-23.htm [hereinafter NIH 
Establishes]. 
 5. See Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH’s Secondhand Shop for Tried-and-Tested Drugs, 332 SCI. 
1492 (2011); Alexander Gaffney, NCATS’ Development Program Looks to Avoid Regulatory 
Hurdles for Once-Abandoned Drugs, REG. FOCUS (June 18, 2013), https://www.raps.org/focus-
online/news/news-article-view/article/3646/. 
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The Repurposing Project pairs university researchers with drug 
candidates owned by pharmaceutical companies that have failed in 
their first attempts to treat diseases. The university researchers 
develop and submit proposals to repurpose the drugs to treat different 
diseases. The NIH then reviews the scientific merits of the project 
proposals and chooses a group of projects to fund. In the first year of 
the Repurposing Project, the NIH received over 160 project proposals 
and chose nine projects to fund in June of 2013.
6
 The NIH intends to 
continue the Repurposing Project in future years, inviting a new set 
of university proposals for evaluation.
7
 
The linchpin for getting the Repurposing Project off the ground 
was convincing the pharmaceutical companies to allow outside 
researchers to experiment with their patented drugs. If an outside 
researcher were to be successful in finding a new use for the drug, the 
company’s intellectual property (IP) ownership over the drug would 
be diluted. This, in turn, would limit the company’s ability to profit 
from the drug. In a break from their normally secretive business 
practices,
8
 the eight participating pharmaceutical companies 
published Collaborative Research Agreements (CRAs) on the NIH’s 
website that outline the intellectual property rights they were willing 
to give up in order to participate in the project.
9
 
In this Note, I will discuss the content of the CRAs developed for 
the Repurposing Project. I will examine the IP provisions that each of 
the eight participating companies incorporated into its CRA. While 
all of the companies were willing to allow university researchers to 
 
 6. NIH to Fund Collaborations with Industry to Identify New Uses for Existing 
Compounds, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (June 18, 2013), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/jun2013/ 
ncats-18.htm [hereinafter NIH to Fund Collaborations]; Asher Mullard, An Audience With 
Chris Austin, 12 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 182, 183 (2013). 
 7. Christine M. Colvis & Christopher P. Austin, Innovation in Therapeutics 
Development at the NCATS, 39 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY REVS. 230 (forthcoming 
2014). 
 8. See, e.g., Lorraine E. Ferris, Industry-Sponsored Pharmaceutical Trials and Research 
Ethics Boards: Are They Cloaked in Too Much Secrecy?, 166 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1279, 1279–
80 (2002). 
 9. The eight participating companies are AbbVie (formally Abbott), AstraZeneca, 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. (“Bristol”), Eli Lilly & Co. (“Lilly”), GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen 
Pharmaceutical Research & Development, L.L.C. (“Janssen”), Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”), and 
Sanofi. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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acquire patents over their discoveries,
10
 they were not willing to do so 
unconditionally. As a result, the CRAs require researchers to give the 
companies the first opportunity to repurchase these patent rights via a 
royalty-bearing license. Royalty payments are written into the CRAs 
and are structured to reward each party for their relative contributions 
to the project. This scheme enables the drug companies to continue 
developing these drugs with an eye towards the market and the 
patients who await the therapies. 
In this Note, I will argue that the Repurposing Project aligns the 
skills and interests of three of the most important entities in 
biomedical research: universities, drug companies, and the NIH. By 
bringing these institutions together, NCATS has created an 
environment in which the three entities can build off of each other’s 
strengths—a triune synergy—that has and will continue to make a 
positive impact on drug repurposing projects, biomedical research, 
and global health. Part II of this Note discusses the process of 
researching and developing pharmaceuticals. It highlights the 
problem of the Valley of Death and its repercussions in the fields of 
medicine and public health. It also describes the Repurposing Project 
proposed by the NIH as a means to help solve those problems.  
Part III discusses issues that can arise in partnerships between 
university researchers and pharmaceutical companies in the area of 
biomedical research and development, such as concerns over 
intellectual property. Part IV details the provisions of the CRAs 
posted by the eight pharmaceutical companies participating in the 
pilot Repurposing Project. In Part V, this Note analyzes and evaluates 
the Repurposing Project and the CRAs.  
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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II. THE REPURPOSING PROJECT AS A BRIDGE  
ACROSS THE VALLEY OF DEATH 
A. The Valley of Death in Biomedical Research and Development 
Biomedical research has long been a priority in the United States, 
with a total of $119.3 billion spent on the endeavor in 2012 alone.
11
 
The sources of biomedical research funding are diverse; both public 
and private sources provide funding. The NIH provides the majority 
of the public funding.
12
 Pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology 
companies,
13
 and nonprofit interest groups contribute much of the 
private funding.
14
 Each funding entity has its own role and objective 
in pharmaceutical development.
15
  
In order to develop a therapeutic for a disease, a cellular or 
molecular target for that disease must be discovered through basic 
scientific research.
16
 The next step is to design a chemical or 
 
 11. Justin Chakma et al., Asia’s Ascent—Global Trends in Biomedical R&D Expenditures, 
370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3, 4 (2014).  
 12. With the sum of $27.8 billion, the NIH provided 84 percent of federal funding towards 
biomedical research in 2007. E. Ray Dorsey et al., Funding of U.S. Biomedical Research, 2003–
2008, 303 JAMA 137, 139 (2010). 
 13. A reported $51.9 billion was spent on biopharmaceutical research in 2007. This 
represented the largest contribution at 58 percent of total national funding. Id. at 138–40. 
 14. The Health Research Alliance (“HRA”), a consortium of thirty-two private, nonprofit 
funders of biomedical research, awarded $1.024 billion in grants in 2008. Elizabeth R. Myers et 
al., Similarities and Differences in Philanthropic and Federal Support for Medical Research in 
the United States: An Analysis of Funding by Nonprofits in 2006–2008, 87 ACAD. MED. 1574, 
1575 (2012) (Table 1). This figure represents approximately 40 percent of total philanthropic 
health research funding. Id. at 1575. 
 15. Generally speaking, university researchers focus on basic scientific discoveries 
elucidating causes of disease (and, therefore, the potential targets for drugs). The funding for 
these projects comes from public dollars, typically from the NIH. Every other step of the 
process, from preclinical in vitro studies through Phase III clinical trials, is traditionally 
conducted by pharmaceutical companies. See generally Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of 
Public-Sector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and Vaccines, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535 
(2011). As discussed in this Note, the Repurposing Project modifies this paradigm, uniting 
university researchers and pharmaceutical companies in preclinical and early-phase clinical 
research. 
 16. For example, in 1989, researchers discovered that the gene CFTR was mutated in 
cystic fibrosis patients, making it an ideal target for pharmaceutical intervention. John R. 
Riordan et al., Identification of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Cloning and Characterization of 
Complementary DNA, 245 SCI. 1066, 1066, 1071 (1989). The story of seeking a cure for cystic 
fibrosis through targeting the CFTR gene serves as an informative anecdote about the Valley of 
Death, because in the twenty-four years since the gene’s discovery, science has not yet provided 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/14
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biological molecule that will interact with the disease target.
17
 For the 
purposes of this Note, both small molecule chemicals and biological 
therapies will be referred to as “drugs.”18 Once a drug candidate is 
discovered, it is subtly manipulated to maximize its potential.
19
 Next, 
the lead drug candidate is tested in vitro to see if it has the intended 
mechanistic effects.
20
 The final preclinical step entails testing the 
drug in animal models, such as mice and monkeys, to determine if the 
drug is safe and has any biological effect in the model, non-human 
organism.
21
 Basic research is traditionally carried out in university 
laboratories with public funding, and other preclinical steps are 
usually conducted by pharmaceutical companies.
22
 
Once all preclinical tests are complete, the drug developer must 
submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to start clinical 
 
the silver bullet therapy many anticipated. See Helen Pearson, One Gene, Twenty Years, 460 
NATURE 165, 165 (2009) (reviewing the efforts of the scientific community to discover a cure 
for cystic fibrosis). The first and only drug targeting CFTR was approved in February 2012, but 
it only works on a rare form of the disease present in 4 percent of the population. Jocelyn 
Kaiser, New Cystic Fibrosis Drug Offers Hope, at a Price, 335 SCI. 645, 645 (2012). 
 17. See Christopher Lipinski & Andrew Hopkins, Navigating Chemical Space for Biology 
and Medicine, 432 NATURE 855 (2004) (providing an overview of the canonical small molecule 
drug development paradigm). 
 18. This definition is appropriate because the library of fifty-eight drugs provided by the 
pharmaceutical companies for the NCATS Repurposing Project contain both small molecules 
and biologics. See infra note 48. 
 19. Maximizing the pharmacokinetics while minimizing the toxic effects of the drug at 
this stage will ostensibly lead to a higher probability of ultimate success. See generally Karen L. 
Steinmetz & Edward G. Spack, The Basics of Preclinical Drug Development for 
Neurodegenerative Disease Indications, 9 BIOMEDCENTRAL NEUROLOGY 1 (Supp. 2009) 
(focusing on neurological drugs); James M. Gallo, Pharmacokinetic/Pharmacodynamic-Driven 
Drug Development, 77 MT. SINAI J. MED. 381 (2010) (focusing on cancer drugs).  
 20. See Lipinski & Hopkins, supra note 17, at 857 (discussing the high throughput in vitro 
model of drug development). 
 21. See id. at 855 (discussing different discovery and development paradigms for small 
molecule and biological drugs); Steinmetz & Spack, supra note 19, at 8 (“Definitive animal 
studies establish the safety characteristics, including the no observable adverse effect level 
(NOAEL), of the candidate drug. With very few exceptions, these studies are rigorously 
documented and conducted under regulatory guidelines . . . .”). 
 22. Stevens et al., supra note 15, at 535 (“Historically, public-sector researchers have 
performed the upstream, basic research that elucidated the underlying mechanisms of disease 
and identified promising points of intervention, whereas corporate researchers have performed 
the downstream, applied research resulting in the discovery of drugs for the treatment of 
diseases . . . .”). 
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testing.
23
 The FDA will grant an IND only if the preclinical data 
suggests a favorable benefit versus risk profile.
24
 Thus, preclinical 
data carries substantial value in the pharmaceutical industry. Once an 
IND has been granted, in-human clinical trials can commence.
25
  
Clinical trials usually consist of three phases. During these phases, 
researchers determine the ideal dosage and patient population for the 
drug.
26
 After Phase III, the drug developer can file a New Drug 
Application (NDA).
27
 The FDA will approve an NDA if the totality 
of the data shows a positive risk versus reward profile for the new 
drug.
28
 In addition to balancing the risks and rewards of the proposed 
drug, the FDA also determines which indications the drug will be 
approved for, and which precautions must be listed on the label.
29
 
This odyssey of development is long (taking an average of 
thirteen years),
30
 expensive (costing approximately one billion dollars 
per approved drug),
31
 and prone to failure (failing more than 95 
percent of the time).
32
 Facing these substantial hurdles, many 
pharmaceutical companies have moved away from preclinical 
development,
33
 focusing instead on clinical projects for diseases that 
 
 23. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/ap
provalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Phase I clinical trials involve the use of lower, sub-therapeutic doses, and are not 
intended to research the efficacy of the drug. Instead, the way the body processes the drug 
(pharmacokinetics) and the drug’s toxicity are studied. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2013). In Phase II 
studies, the dosage is steadily raised to determine which dosage achieves the most favorable 
balance between therapeutic effect and deleterious side effects. Id. Finally, in Phase III trials, 
the final dose is tested across a large population (hundreds to thousands) for a longer time 
period to ensure both efficacy and safety. Id.  
 27. See New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs 
/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/ 
NewDrugApplicationNDA/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Collins, supra note 2. 
 31. See Scannell et al., supra note 1. 
 32. See Collins, supra note 2, at 3. These metrics are notoriously difficult to calculate with 
precision because of the diversity of players in the field, the myriad costs that apply across 
different sectors of the industry, and the multitude ways in which a project can fail. See also 
infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 33. John LaMattina, Universities Stepping Up Efforts to Discover Drugs, FORBES, Oct. 
21, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/10/21/universities-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/14
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are difficult to target but will yield higher profit margins.
34
 This has 
created a chasm between preclinical and clinical development such 
that potential projects based on basic scientific discoveries have 
failed to advance towards therapeutic development. This abyss is 
known as the “Valley of Death.”35 Concomitant with (and perhaps 
because of) the emergence of the Valley of Death, the overall 
efficiency of biomedical research, as measured by the amount of 
money it takes to get one new drug approved, has been declining on a 
logarithmic scale.
36
 These systemic problems have led to negative 
consequences for the fields of medicine and human health: of the 
approximately 4,500 diseases that have a known physiological cause, 
only 250 have an FDA-approved therapy.
37
 In an effort to combat 
these problems, the different players in the field of biomedical 
 
stepping-up-efforts-to-discover-drugs/. Small biotech companies have filled the preclinical void 
left by larger pharmaceutical companies. Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in 
Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 429 (2010). Exacerbating the 
problem, venture capital firms, which used to be the major source of funding for biotech 
companies doing preclinical testing, have followed the pharmaceutical companies in avoiding 
the high-risk preclinical projects. MoneyTree Report, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=historical (last visited Feb. 8, 
2013) (narrowing search parameters to the biotechnology sector). 
 34. See Pammolli et al., supra note 33, at 431. The authors reviewed the Pharmaceutical 
Index Database to determine the areas in which pharmaceutical companies have shifted the 
focus of their research. They found that companies are pursuing difficult targets and that those 
projects have been decreasing their probability of success. Id. at 429, 433. These projects are 
more costly, as later phase clinical trials are also more expensive. Christopher P. Adams & Van 
V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 420, 423 (2006) (showing mean Phase I cost at $31 million, mean Phase II cost at 
$42 million, and mean Phase III cost at $119 million in year 2000 dollars). Such projects also 
have higher failure rates. Pammolli et al., supra note 33, at 429. 
 35. The Valley of Death can be conceptualized in multiple ways. The most common way 
is to put basic research on one side and clinical medicine on the other. Put another way, this 
puts scientists and doctors on opposite sides of the valley. See generally Declan Butler, 
Translational Research: Crossing the Valley of Death, 453 NATURE 840 (2008) (discussing the 
historical development of the Valley of Death and one of the early NIH responses—the 
development of a nationwide network of clinical translational science centers affiliated with 
major research universities). 
 36. See Scannell et al., supra note 1, at 192. The authors termed this logarithmic decrease 
“Eroom’s Law,” because it is the exact opposite of Moore’s Law—the logarithmic increase that 
describes the advances of the technology industry. Id. at 191. 
 37. FRANCIS S. COLLINS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH’S NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIS. 10 (Apr. 12, 2012) (on file with author). 
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research and development have attempted to refine their operations 
with the goal of building bridges across the Valley of Death.
38
 
B. NCATS and the Repurposing Project  
In 2003, then-NIH Director Dr. Elias Zerhouni made translational 
research a priority.
39
 Translational research is impossible to define 
with precision because of the myriad scientific procedures that can be 
classified as “translational.”40 However, it can be functionally 
described as any type of research that is meant to alleviate the 
problems of the Valley of Death by translating biomedical 
discoveries into FDA-approved therapies.
41
 Dr. Zerhouni’s successor 
at the NIH, Dr. Francis Collins,
42
 continued the NIH’s commitment to 
 
 38. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE & 
OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MED. PRODUCTS 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/CriticalPathOpportun
itiesReports/ucm077262.htm (concluding, inter alia, that the “medical product development 
process is no longer able to keep pace with basic scientific innovation” and that “[w]e must 
modernize the critical development path that leads from scientific discovery to the patient”). 
 39. Elias Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, 302 SCI. 63, 63 (2003). After consulting with 300 
leaders in biomedical research and development and deliberating within NIH-led working 
groups, the NIH launched a number of new initiatives that fit under the broad umbrella of 
translational research. Id. The stated goals of the roadmap were to “reengineer[] the clinical 
research enterprise” and to forge “research teams of the future.” Id. at 63. The Repurposing 
Project analyzed in this Note resonates with both of those goals and, therefore, is a prime 
example of how the NIH has continued to develop its goals in promoting translational science. 
 40. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 35, at 841 (“Ask ten people what translational research 
means and you’re likely to get ten different answers.”); Collins, supra note 2, at 2–4 (describing 
with specificity ten distinct biomedical translational research projects that could help cross the 
Valley of Death). 
 41. “Bench to bedside” is an oft-used descriptor of translational research. Since most 
biological research is done at a laboratory bench and final treatments are delivered at a patient’s 
bedside, the phrase is fitting. Butler, supra note 35, at 841. 
 42. Dr. Collins has been an ardent, pragmatic, and hard-working proponent of advancing 
translational research as NIH Director, for which he has been the recipient of some criticism. 
Jocelyn Kaiser, Jeremy Berg: An Independent Scientist Departs NIH’s Ranks, 332 SCI. 533, 533 
(2011). To understand Dr. Collins’ vision as NIH Director, it is important to note that his career 
has been replete with struggles to traverse the Valley of Death. Earlier in his career, Dr. Collins 
was among the group of researchers who discovered the CFTR gene, for which there have been 
significant difficulties in developing a pharmaceutical therapy. See Riordan et al., supra note 
16. Subsequently, Dr. Collins led the Human Genome Project, which has generated an 
explosion of basic scientific knowledge regarding human biology, but also requires a multitude 
of translational research to accrue actual medical benefits. See generally Francis S. Collins et 
al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 300 SCI. 286, 289–90 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/14
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translational research by launching the National Center for 
Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) in December 2011.
43
 
NCATS’ mission is to “catalyze the generation of innovative 
methods and technologies that will enhance the development, testing 
and implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics across a wide 
range of human diseases and conditions.”44  
Shortly after its inception, NCATS launched the Repurposing 
Project.
45
 The Project facilitates research partnerships between 
pharmaceutical companies and university researchers. Traditionally, 
pharmaceutical companies have fiercely protected the identity of and 
preclinical data behind a potential drug candidate.
46
 If a project fails 
in its first attempt at FDA approval, however, the only way a 
company can profit from the drug is to repurpose it to treat another 
disease. The Repurposing Project is meant to unite a university 
 
(2003) (prescribing the future scientific work needed to translate the information gleaned from 
the Human Genome Project into medical treatments). 
 43. See NIH Establishes, supra note 4. The process of creating NCATS began in May 
2010, when Dr. Collins requested the Scientific Management Review Board (“SMRB”) 
determine how NIH could better support translational and therapeutic sciences. In December 
2010, the SMRB recommended a new translational medicine and therapeutics center be created, 
and for NIH to conduct an extensive and detailed analysis of what the new center’s impact 
would be. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, REPORT ON TRANSLATIONAL MED. & THERAPEUTICS 2 (Dec. 
7, 2010), available at smrb.od.nih.gov/documents/reports/TMAT_122010.pdf. In accordance 
with that directive, Dr. Collins assembled an NCATS working group and the Advisory Council 
to the Director on NCATS to brainstorm about specific projects that NCATS could undertake. 
Francis Collins, Catalyzing Innovation: The NIH National Center for Advancing Translational 
Sciences, PowerPoint presentation delivered at the National Institute of Health (Mar. 14, 2011) 
(PowerPoint on file with author). It took Congress one year to officially approve NCATS. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74 (2011). 
 44. About NCATS, NAT’L CTR. ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., http://www.ncats 
.nih.gov/about/mission.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 45. See Kaiser, supra note 5. NCATS staff spent months planning and coordinating with 
the participating pharmaceutical companies before the Repurposing Project was launched. On 
April 21 and 22, 2011, Dr. Collins hosted an NIH-Industry Roundtable for Exploring New Uses 
for Abandoned and Approved Therapeutics. The purpose was to introduce a model 
Collaborative Research Agreement, crafted by the NIH’s Office of General Counsel (materials, 
including the draft model agreement, on file with author). The eight participating companies’ 
CRAs that are discussed in this Note were based on that model agreement. 
 46. See generally F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the 
United States 6–9 (Harvard University School of Government Faculty Working Paper Series 
RWP07-42, 2007). See also Peter Gwynne & Gary Heebner, Laboratory Technology Trends: 
Drug Discovery: 4: Protecting the Assets, 297 SCI. 2083, 2086 (2002) (quoting Head of 
Patents, Pharma, and Generics for Novartis: “We pursue all ways of protecting our drug 
products and take a defensive approach to protecting our research tools.”).  
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researcher, who has an idea for the new disease target, with the 
pharmaceutical company that has IP rights to the drug.
47
  
In 2013, which served as the pilot year for the Project, eight 
participating pharmaceutical companies posted information about 
fifty-eight potential drugs on the NCATS website.
48
 Each of the eight 
companies signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
NIH, outlining the goals of the Repurposing Project and the 
responsibilities of the company.
49
 University researchers then 
prepared a pre-proposal for a repurposing project based on the posted 
drug information.
50
 The researchers with the top pre-proposals, as 
decided through NIH’s peer review process, drafted full Project Plans 
in collaboration with the relevant company.
51
 These Project Plans 
included the specific activities of each party, the transfer of the drug 
from the company, and specific stop/go criteria that would determine 
when the project was concluded and whether the company would 
continue to develop the drug towards FDA approval.
52
 After 
reviewing the full Project Plans, NCATS chose the most meritorious 
 
 47. One way to visualize the project in terms of the Valley of Death is to imagine that 
pharmaceutical companies hold a large pile of potentially therapeutic molecules on one side of 
the valley, while university researchers have a mountain of scientific knowledge about the 
mechanisms that cause disease on the other side of the valley. The purpose of the Repurposing 
Project is to build a bridge between these two camps to allow collaboration towards clinical 
development.  
 48. NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., DISCOVERING NEW 
THERAPEUTIC USES FOR EXISTING MOLECULES (June 2013), available at http://www 
.ncats.nih.gov/files/factsheet-therapeutics.pdf. The information includes, for example, the 
mechanism of action, safety/tolerability, and the overview of clinical development for each 
drug, as well as links to clinical trial data (if any) and publications (if any). Library of Industry-
Provided Agents, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., http://www.ncats.nih 
.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/therapeutic-uses/directory.html (last visited Feb. 
8, 2013). 
 49. C. M. Colvis et al., Partners for Therapeutic Discovery, 93 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 24, 25 (2013). NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & CO. CONCERNING NIH-INDUS. PROGRAM: 
DISCOVERING NEW USES FOR EXISTING MOLECULES, available at http://www.ncats 
.nih.gov/files/MOU-template.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter MOU].  
 50. MOU, supra note 49 at 4. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 4–5. 
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projects to fund. NCATS received over 160 pre-proposals,
53
 from 
which it chose nine projects to initially fund in June of 2013.
54
 
As repurposed drugs are eligible for new patents, the Repurposing 
Project as a whole poses difficulties for the participating 
pharmaceutical companies. These new method-of-use patents would 
last longer and therefore be more profitable than the original 
patents.
55
 Since only inventors are vested with the property rights of 
their inventions, theoretically, pharmaceutical companies involved in 
the Repurposing Project risk losing their patent protection to the 
university researcher if the drug turns out to be useful for its new 
purpose.
56
 Thus, to ensure this risk is properly offset by the potential 
benefits, each company involved in the Repurposing Project crafts a 
model Collaborative Research Agreement (“CRA”), which each 
researcher must sign before beginning the project.
57
  
 
 53. Mullard, supra note 6, at 183. 
 54. NIH to Fund Collaborations, supra note 6. 
 55. These new patents would be method-of-use patents, which provide rights to the drug 
only when used in the course of the particular treatment. See Manual of Patent Examining and 
Procedure § 2106.01 2100-1, 2100-20 (2012) (“A claim with steps that add something of 
significance to the natural laws themselves would be eligible because it would confine its reach 
to particular patent-eligible applications of those laws, such as a typical patent on a new drug 
(including associated method claims) or a new way of using an existing drug.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 56. “Conception is the touchstone of inventorship . . . .” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “Conception is complete when one of ordinary 
skill in the art could construct the apparatus without unduly extensive research or 
experimentation.” Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Based on those two 
definitions, the university researcher will inevitably be either the sole inventor or joint-inventor 
of any method-of-use patent that arises through the Repurposing Project. Thus, if the 
pharmaceutical company wants to maintain complete ownership over the IP rights of the 
project, it must force the researcher to assign his/her rights to the company or buy back a 
license from the research university. See infra notes 107–12 and accompanying text. 
 57. Each company uploaded its template agreement available for download from the 
NCATS website. See generally Template Agreements, NAT’L CTR. ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/ 
therapeutic-uses/agreements.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). It would be difficult for university 
researchers to lawfully obtain the research drug without first obtaining a license from the 
company through an agreement like a CRA. Although a researcher at a public university can 
invoke sovereign immunity in defense of an infringement action, and therefore can, in theory, 
infringe with impunity, such a situation is unlikely in practice. RICHARD S. GRUNER ET AL., 
TRANSACTIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM STARTUPS TO PUBLIC COMPANIES 893–94 
(2012). Most companies ask public universities to waive their right to invoke sovereign 
immunity in defense of an infringement suit when they sign a partnership agreement. Id. 
Alternatively, a university researcher could try to experiment with the drug without the drug 
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III. CONCERNS THAT ARISE DURING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
Two major points of friction arise between universities and 
companies participating in the Repurposing Project: Who is entitled 
to control the future arising IP? And how should the costs, risks, and 
rewards be allocated amongst the participants? In this section, these 
questions will be analyzed from the perspectives of the university 
participant, the private pharmaceutical company, and the patients 
who await the fruits of biomedical research.
58
 A well-designed 
collaborative project should create synergies between the 
participants’ skills and goals that will drive innovation in drug 
repurposing research. 
A. Future Arising Intellectual Property 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allows recipients of federal grants to 
keep the IP rights to inventions arising from those publicly-funded 
research projects.
59
 This resulted in an explosion of university-owned 
 
company’s permission following the ruling in Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193, 208 (2005). In Merck, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) experimental use exception to infringement. If an experimenter has a “reasonable 
basis for believing that the experiments will produce the types of information that are relevant 
to an IND or NDA,” he can use a patented drug in that experiment without the patent holder’s 
permission. Id. at 208 (internal quotations omitted). In practice, however, a researcher would 
need more than just the physical drug to do an effective repurposing experiment. He would also 
need supplemental information, such as how to make and use the drug in experiments. This 
know-how is likely protected as confidential information by the company. Additionally, in 
order to apply for an IND, the researcher will need to submit preliminary safety and toxicology 
data. These are also confidential trade secrets. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, 
Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on 
Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483, 483 (2007).  
 58. Because of its mission to “seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior 
of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and 
reduce illness and disability,” the NIH will serve as a proxy for patients awaiting cures and the 
enterprise of biomedical research as a whole for the purposes of discussing policy interests in 
this Note. About NIH: Mission, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2013).  
 59. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 200-212 (1994)). 
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patents.
60
 Since universities traditionally focus on basic research and 
generally do not have the capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals,
61
 
they often license their patented discoveries to private companies that 
are built to drive projects through clinical development.
62
 In this 
traditional paradigm, universities and pharmaceutical companies 
operate at arms-length. Universities’ technology transfer offices bring 
in substantial revenue to their institutions through licensing patented 
inventions.
63
 Thus, in a biomedical research partnership, the 
university typically prefers to be the owner (or co-owner) of future 
arising patents so it can generate revenue through licensing 
agreements.
64
 
 
 60. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291–92 (2003). The goal of the Bayh-Dole Act 
was to spur further development of basic research discoveries by extending intellectual property 
protection to those discoveries. 35 U.S.C. 200 (2006) (stating that the purpose of the Bayh-Dole 
Act is to “use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
funded research or development . . . .”). With the basic research guarded by a patent, a private 
pharmaceutical company would only be willing to buy a license to use that patent if it could be 
assured a reasonable return on investment through developing the product to gain FDA 
approval.  
 61. See Stevens et al., supra note 15. 
 62. See, e.g., Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. v. Xenon Pharm., Inc., 591 F.3d 876 
(7th Cir. 2010). See also Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic 
Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 31 (2006). 
 63. In 2011 alone, licensing revenues from technology transfer offices totaled at least $2.5 
billion. ASS’N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING ACTIVITIES SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 3 
(2011), available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY_2011_Licensing_ 
Activity_Survey&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8731. 
 64. In Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems., Inc., 
researchers employed at Stanford University collaborated with a private company to learn about 
a scientific method called PCR. 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The contract between Stanford 
and the company stated that the researchers would assign any patent rights that the researchers 
“may devise as a consequence of his work at [the company]” to the company. Id. at 837 
(internal quotations omitted). Subsequently, the researchers developed a diagnostic test based 
on PCR to determine the amount of HIV virus in a patient’s blood. Id. This research and 
development was funded by an NIH grant while conducted at Stanford, but was also done at the 
private company in collaboration with the company’s employed researchers. Stanford applied 
for and obtained several patents pursuant to the Bayh-Dole Act. Id. at 838. Since universities, as 
opposed to individual researchers, are the recipients of the NIH grant money, Stanford 
University was the assignee of the patent that issued. When Stanford discovered that the private 
company had continued to develop its PCR-based HIV detection products, it brought suit for 
infringement. The Federal Circuit ruled that the agreement between the researcher and the 
company to assign any future patent rights trumped the default assignment of the patents to 
Stanford. Id. at 844. This case is an illustration of the intellectual property struggles that can 
arise around owning the patent of a method developed during collaborations between university 
researchers and private companies. 
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Unlike universities, pharmaceutical companies focus on drug 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales to generate profits.
65
 To do so, 
companies need to either own the patent or buy a license for the IP 
underlying a particular drug.
66
 Being a licensee rather than a licensor 
is not an entirely unattractive proposition, as licensees may be able to 
avoid patent maintenance and litigation costs.
67
 Therefore, so long as 
the pharmaceutical company has the legal authority to make and use 
the drug, it does not matter who owns the patent in order for a 
company to make its profit.
68
 In the context of the Repurposing 
Project, this flexibility permits companies to forge CRAs that can 
accommodate a university’s desire to acquire patent ownership over 
inventions that arise during the collaboration,
69
 thereby aligning 
interests. 
Patients awaiting new therapies are best served by having 
pragmatic repurposing projects commenced as quickly as possible.
70
 
Thus, from a policy perspective, it is not important who owns the 
future arising intellectual patent, so long as both the pharmaceutical 
 
 65. See Stevens et al., supra note 15. 
 66. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharmaceutical Development and Cost: An American 
Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 721 (2005) 
(“[P]atents on tangible products (such as drugs) and processes (such as methods of treatment) 
might motivate firms to invest in data production in order to develop markets for their 
inventions.”). 
 67. Each patent applicant has to pay $330 upon submission, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 41(a)(1)(A) (2012), and $220 in examination fees, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(3)(A)(i). If 
the patent is approved, the applicant must pay $1,510 for an issue fee. Id. § 41(a)(4)(A). If the 
applicant wants the patent to remain enforceable for its entire twenty-year window, he or she 
must pay $980, $2,480, and $4,110 at interim periods. Id. § 41(b)(1)(A)-(C). The grand total 
comes to $9,660. A 2011 survey indicates that litigation costs for patent-related claims in which 
the amount in controversy was greater than $25 million averages $3 million at the end of 
discovery and $5 million at the end of trial. Jim Kerstetter, How Much is That Patent Lawsuit 
Going to Cost You?, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/ 
how-much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/. 
 68. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 503, 513 (2009) (“Not surprisingly, firms in the [pharmaceutical] industry consistently 
report that patent protection is essential to their efforts to discover and develop new drugs. 
Moreover, it is well known that pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop new 
drugs unless they have strong patent protection over them.”). 
 69. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 70. Meredith Wadman, NIH Director Wins Bid for Translational Medicine Center, 
NATURE (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/101208/full/news.2010.650.html 
(pointing out that Congress too has pushed to “speed therapies to the bedside, as new drug 
pipelines at pharmaceutical companies have languished”). 
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company and the university researcher reach an agreement ex-ante 
that facilitates the project.
71
 This normative approach may seem to 
suggest that CRAs and licenses should be negotiated on a project-by-
project basis. Research has shown, however, that having standardized 
templates for these contracts leads to quicker agreements and, 
therefore, increases social welfare.
72
 Thus, the NCATS Repurposing 
Project was bolstered by the fact that pharmaceutical companies were 
willing to post their template CRAs online as a starting point for 
determining where they stood on issues surrounding intellectual 
property rights.  
B. The Costs and Benefits of Repurposing Projects 
A drug repurposing project that culminates in FDA approval can 
lead to an extremely lucrative pharmaceutical. Indeed, the 
blockbuster Viagra is a repurposed drug. Viagra was originally 
intended to treat angina and hypertension,
73
 but the Phase I clinical 
trials showed only marginal efficacy. The drug was repurposed to 
treat erectile dysfunction, and FDA approval was granted.
74
 In 2010 
alone, Viagra sales for Pfizer totaled $1.928 billion.
75
  
Pharmaceutical companies must carefully choose which drug 
candidates to include in a repurposing project to maximize potential 
 
 71. See generally Roin, supra note 68. 
 72. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 730–33 (1997) (showing that standardized contracts can 
create positive externalities that drive efficiency in forging collaborations). Starting with a 
template gives the university an understanding of what terms are acceptable to the 
pharmaceutical company, decreasing negotiation time in crafting a contract. Thus, the 
Repurposing Projects will launch sooner with the templates in place than in a world where the 
parties would have to negotiate de novo. This, on a macro scale, means that the research 
projects funded by NCATS will start sooner, which is beneficial to both the scientific 
community and to patients awaiting the fruits of the research. 
 73. CASE STUDIES IN DRUG RESCUE & REPURPOSING, NIH-INDUS. ROUNDTABLE: 
EXPLORING NEW USES FOR ABANDONED & APPROVED THERAPEUTICS 39 (2011) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter CASE STUDIES]. 
 74. Many of the male research subjects in the first trial reported unsolicited and 
irrepressible erections, prompting researchers to repurpose the drug for erectile dysfunction. Id. 
 75. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PFIZER INC. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 25, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/78003/000119312511048877/dex13.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2013). 
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profits.
76
 For the pilot Repurposing Project, the eight companies 
chose drugs that were not FDA-approved for their originally intended 
purpose.
77
 This enabled the companies to maximize the time it could 
exclude a generic competitor from the market, thereby maximizing its 
profit potential profitability.
78
 
For any repurposing project, however, a series of costs and 
potential risks stand in the way of realizing the profits of a 
successfully repurposed drug like Viagra.
79
 A goal of the NCATS 
 
 76. The companies have to be sure that the drug has not yet been patented for the process 
of treating any new disease that would be proposed in the NCATS project. See supra note 55 
and accompanying text. A new method-of-use patent would allow the company to exclude 
generic makers from the market for twenty years from the issue of the new method patent. See 
Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 721 (“Data from clinical trials of new uses might expand the 
market for drugs, and patents on drugs and methods of use might be used to exclude free riders 
from competing for these sales during the patent term.”). 
 77. Drug companies sometimes seek to gain FDA approval for the treatment of additional 
diseases after gaining approval for the first. For example, Avastin was originally approved to 
treat metastatic colon and rectal cancer in 2004. In an effort to reach more patients, Avastin’s 
maker, Genentech, launched clinical trials to gain approval for the treatment of metastatic breast 
cancer. Mikkael A. Sekeres, The Avastin Story, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454, 1454 (2011). The 
drug was approved to treat breast cancer in 2008. However, after subsequent long-term 
research, it was determined that Avastin did not confer any benefit to breast cancer patients 
while exposing them to its potent side effects. Id. The FDA revoked its approval for the 
treatment of breast cancer. Id. To determine if the fifty-eight drugs available for the NCATS 
Repurposing Project had previously attained FDA approval for another indication, the author 
searched the FDA Approved Drug Products Database. Drugs at FDA, U.S. FOOD DRUG 
ADMIN.,  http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search 
.Search_Drug_Name (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). As of Feb. 8, 2013, the author determined that 
none of the fifty-eight drugs had been approved by the FDA for the treatment of any disease.  
 78. When a generic manufacturer applies for FDA approval, it needs to certify that it is 
not infringing any patents on the original drug. See generally Arti Rai, Use Patents, Carve-
Outs, and Incentives—A New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491 
(2012). Since method-of-use patents often extend beyond the life of the composition of matter 
patent for a drug (because the method of treatment is discovered after the drug molecule itself), 
the FDA allows generic manufacturers to continue producing and selling the generic version of 
the drug after the composition of matter patent has expired. But in order to do so, it must “carve 
out” the indication covered by the original company’s method-of-use patent. Id. This “carve-
out” option for generics is limited to scenarios where the brand drug is FDA-approved for an 
additional indication beyond the oldest method patent covering the drug. The drug companies in 
this NCATS Drug Repurposing Project have avoided that problem. If the Repurposing Project 
does culminate in an FDA approval for the new disease, the drug will be protected by the new 
method of use patent that arises from the project. Thus, a generic will be entirely unable to 
launch until that new patent expires (after twenty years), giving the pharmaceutical company 
longer market exclusivity than in the traditional drug development paradigm. 
 79. For example, the cost of bringing that repurposed drug through the FDA’s rigorous 
regulatory procedure is a future cost that looms in the background of a repurposing project. See 
Adams & Brantner, supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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Repurposing Project is to spread the costs and risks among the 
pharmaceutical company, the university researcher, and the NIH. 
These costs and risks should also be adequately offset by future 
potential profits.
80
  
The NIH provides the funding for the research described in a 
CRA.
81
 That Project, however, is not intended to be the end of the 
drug’s development. Clinical trials and FDA approval are the 
ultimate goal, and reaching this goal can be quite costly. Each phase 
of clinical development becomes increasingly expensive as the size 
of each clinical trial increases.
82
 This successive increase in cost is 
exacerbated by an unpredictable chance of failure at any point in the 
development pipeline.
83
 Traditionally, pharmaceutical companies 
shoulder this substantial risk. Since the NCATS Repurposing Project 
constitutes just one step in the development process, there must be a 
point at which the Project is handed back to the pharmaceutical 
company, which has the manufacturing capacity to take the drug all 
the way through the FDA-approval process. Once the Project is 
handed back to the company, it alone shoulders the financial costs of 
developing the drug.  
The individual particularities of each drug in the Repurposing 
Project leave open the possibility that future CRAs will be negotiated 
on an individual basis. This approach was used in prior research 
partnerships and was criticized as promoting gridlock.
84
 One proposal 
 
 80. Janice M. Mueller proposed a reach-through royalty system, which provides royalties 
based on a percentage of sales of an approved product. No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 65 (2001). This proposal addressed issues with patented upstream research tools as 
opposed to drug repurposing projects. Id. at 1. However, as the CRAs from this project show, 
infra notes 107–12 and accompanying text, these royalty structures represent a possible 
mechanism of distributing cash rewards based on the allocation of costs and risks between the 
university researcher and pharmaceutical company. 
 81. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 34. 
 83. Phase II success rates are the lowest of any phase and are estimated at between 18 
percent and 28 percent. John Arrowsmith, Phase II Failures: 2008–2010, 10 NATURE REVS. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 1, 1 (2011). Phase III success rates are estimated at 50 percent. John 
Arrowsmith, Phase III and Submission Failures: 2007–2010, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 1, 1 (2011).  
 84. See, e.g., Christopher A Lipinksi, The Anti-Intellectual Effects of Intellectual 
Property, 10 CURRENT OPINIONS CHEM. BIOLOGY 380 (2006) (elucidating the philosophical 
differences in medicinal chemistry requirements between the pharmaceutical industry and 
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to drive more efficient collaborations between pharmaceutical 
companies, holding large libraries of small-molecule drugs, and 
university researchers, who can design assays on a disease target, was 
promoted by Arti Rai et al. in 2008.
85
 The cornerstone of this 
proposal was for a third party honest broker to conduct high 
throughput screening assays to determine promising matches between 
a drug and a target.
86
 Once a successful hit was established, the 
university researcher interested in the target could negotiate the terms 
of a license or a CRA with the pharmaceutical company.
87
 This 
second stage is similar in structure to the NCATS Repurposing 
Project; however, the Repurposing Project utilizes CRAs with a 
standardized agreement, analyzed below.
88
  
 
academia that hinders IP negotiations). A broad survey of academia revealed that negotiations 
between other academic institutions went relatively smoothly. John P. Walsh et al., Where 
Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical 
Research, 36 RES. POL’Y 1184, 1184–91 (2007). However, attempts to acquire a tangible 
research input was significantly more likely to fail between a university researcher and a 
pharmaceutical company than between two university researchers. Id. at 1191.  
 85. Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property 
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discoveries, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008). 
 86. Id. at 21–25. While the proposed project was operating in the first-tier “veil of 
ignorance” stage, the drugs could be used by the third party honest broker based on 
standardized licensing agreements common to all pharmaceutical companies. Only if a 
promising lead was discovered would the drug be un-blinded, and negotiations for a 
collaboration agreement would ensue between the university researcher and pharmaceutical 
company.  
 87. “Because the terms of such second-tier partnerships are likely to vary quite 
substantially depending on the type of target at issue, we do not propose standard-form 
agreements for this tier.” Id. at 25.  
 88. Rai et al. agreed that standardized agreements were important for efficiently and 
quickly starting the research project. Id. at 12. The authors, however, envision that stage of 
collaboration as a different scientific experiment than what is actually happening at NCATS. 
Instead of the third party conducting the high throughput screen to identify matches between 
drugs and targets, NCATS has already narrowed the targets and mechanisms of action for 
which each of the fifty-eight drugs will be used. See Clarification for the NIH-Industry Pilot 
Program: Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules PAR-12-203 (X02) Pre-
Application, & Limited Competition RFA-TR-12-004 (UH2/UH3) & RFA-TR-12-005 (UH3), 
NAT’L CTR. ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI. (July 20, 2012), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
guide/notice-files/NOT-TR-12-008.html (“[A]pplications that are not proposing studies 
investigating one of the Agents or targets/mechanisms of action listed on the NCATS website 
. . . will not be responsive and will not be accepted for review. Compounds must be used in 
their current formulation. New formulations will not be responsive.”). Compared to the Rai et 
al. proposal, the Repurposing Project has foregone the first tier of the proposal and moved on to 
the second tier. Moreover, the drugs in the Repurposing Project have already completed 
preclinical screening and even early-phase clinical work. Thus, the collaborations forged by 
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IV. CONTENT OF THE CRAS 
The standardized CRAs begin by laying out the governance 
structures that will oversee the particular project. A Performance 
Assessment Committee (“PAC”) comprised of two representatives 
from the company and two from the research institution is charged 
with reviewing the progress of the project and deciding whether or 
not to file for a patent on any discoveries, as well as aligning and 
communicating with the Steering Committee (“SC”).89 The SC 
consists of the principal university researcher, the director of the 
program from the company, and NIH oversight personnel, including 
the NIH Project Scientist and NIH Program Official.
90
 The SC is the 
ultimate decision-making committee, as it decides whether the 
 
these CRAs promote research further down the developmental pipeline than envisioned by Rai 
et al. 
 89. See generally Collaborative Research Agreement between Abbot Laboratories (the 
Company) and [Academic Medical Center] § 4.1, available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ 
files/CRA-Abbott.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter AbbVie CRA]; Collaborative 
Research Agreement between Astrazeneca AB (the Company) and [Academic Medical Center] 
§ 4.1, available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-AZ.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) 
[hereinafter AstraZeneca CRA]; Collaborative Research Agreement between Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Company (the “Company”) and [Academic Medical Center] § 4.1, available at 
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-BMS.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Bristol 
CRA]; Collaborative Research Agreement between Glaxosmithkline, LLC and [Academic 
Medical Center] § 4.1, available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-GSK.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter GlaxoSmithKline CRA]; Collaborative Research Agreement between 
Janssen Pharmaceutical Research & Development, L.L.C. (the Company) and Academic 
Medical Center § 4.1, available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-Janssen.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Janssen CRA]; Collaborative Research Agreement between Pfizer 
Inc. and [Academic Medical Center] § 4.1, available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-
Pfizer.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Pfizer CRA]; Collaborative Research 
Agreement between Sanofi-Aventis U.S. Inc. and [Academic Medical Center] § 4.1, available 
at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/CRA-Sanofi.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Sanofi 
CRA]. Eli Lilly’s CRA does not reference a PAC, and the only reference to a steering 
committee is found in § 4.5: “Consistent with its role as an advisory non-sponsor, Lilly shall be 
a non-voting member of the Steering Committee.” Collaborative Research Agreement between 
Eli Lilly and Company and [Academic Medical Center] § 4.5, available at http://www.ncats 
.nih.gov/files/CRA-Lilly.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Lilly CRA].  
 90. See AbbVie CRA, supra note 89, § 4.1.7.1; AstraZeneca CRA, supra note 89, 
§ 4.1.7.1; Bristol CRA, supra note 89, § 4.1.7.1; GlaxoSmithKline CRA, supra note 89, 
§ 4.1.7.1; Janssen CRA, supra note 89, § 4.1.7.1. Pfizer and Sanofi remain silent on the 
composition of the Steering Committee, ostensibly leaving it to the discretion of the NIH. They 
do, however, acknowledge that the PAC will “align and communicate with the steering 
committee of the NIH Grant.” See Pfizer CRA, supra note 89, § 4.1.6; Sanofi CRA, supra note 
89, § 4.1.6. 
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stop/go criteria described in the Project Plan have been met. It is also 
charged with ensuring timely publication of all research results 
(including negative results).
91
 
The next section in the CRA assigns responsibilities to the 
company, the researcher, and the NIH. The company provides the 
research drug,
92
 any required background knowledge, and previously 
acquired data that would support an IND application.
93
 Generally, 
these data are and will remain confidential.
94
 The researcher is 
responsible for sponsoring any clinical trials, filing the IND with the 
FDA, and gaining Institutional Review Board approval of the 
research protocol.
95
 Additionally, under the CRA, the researcher must 
submit progress reports to the SC so it can monitor progress of the 
project in accordance with the NIH grant.
96
 The NIH’s main role is to 
 
 91. Supra note 90. The publication of research results can become contentious. University 
researchers need to publish in peer-reviewed journals to increase their academic reputation and 
their chance of attaining tenure. Neal S. Young et al., Why Current Publication Practices May 
Distort Science, 5 PLOS MED. 1418, 1420 (2008). The researcher’s desire to publish can 
conflict with private pharmaceutical companies’ goals in three situations. First, if the company 
wants to keep the research results as a trade secret, it cannot be published. See NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 5 (Approved 
Draft 1985), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_ 
final_85.pdf. Second, if the results will lead to a patent application, companies will want to file 
their patent applications before the publication is submitted. See Gwynne & Heebner, supra 
note 46, at 2084 (“Once the patent application is on file, disclosure will not jeopardize the 
applicant’s ability to obtain the patent.”). Finally, if the results of the research are unfavorable, 
the company will not want that information disclosed to the public or to its competitors. For an 
egregious example of this, see Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1238 (1997). The CRAs acknowledge the importance of publication to the researcher. Before 
publishing, however, the researcher must submit the manuscript to the company. The company 
can make changes to the manuscript if it discloses confidential information belonging to the 
company. Additionally, the company can ask the researcher to delay publication for thirty days 
so it can file a patent covering the information disclosed in the manuscript. See, e.g., AbbVie 
CRA, supra note 89, § 11.  
 92. See, e.g., AstraZeneca CRA, supra note 89, § 6.1. 
 93. The Memorandum of Understanding each company signed with the NIH provides that 
it will give the researcher data regarding the drug that would be included in “regulatory data 
packages,” including data for “inclusion in an Investigational New Drug (IND) application,” as 
well as “appropriate research and drug development expertise and enabling technologies” for 
the drug. Template Agreements, supra note 57, § A(2)(e) (internal quotations omitted). 
Furthermore, the company will provide “[p]harmacokinetics data analysis, pharmacokinetics 
modeling to calculate bioequivalence and drug exposure data, and biomarker . . . [p]rocedures.” 
Id.  
 94. See, e.g., Bristol CRA, supra note 89, § 7.1. 
 95. See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline CRA, supra note 89, § 5.41. 
 96. See, e.g., id. § 5.1. 
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provide funding for the research outlined in the Project Plan.
97
 The 
company is not required to provide any cash to the researcher,
98
 and 
each party is expected to pay for its own administrative costs.
99
 
Each party retains their preexisting patent rights.
100
 Ownership of 
patentable discoveries that arise during the Project will be determined 
by “inventorship” as currently defined by U.S. patent law,101 meaning 
whoever conceives the patentable idea will be the inventor or co-
inventor.
102
 The company has sole discretion about the content of its 
patent application and where to file.
103
 For jointly-owned patents and 
patents completely owned by the university, the company will give 
substantive comments as to the scope of the claims of the patent and 
will choose where to file the patent applications.
104
 In return for this 
control, the company agrees to pay all application fees, maintenance 
fees, and opposition fees (such as interference proceedings).
105
 
The cornerstone of the CRA is found in its provisions for the 
conclusion of the Project. Once the Project has reached its end point, 
 
 97. See, e.g., id. § 6.2. 
 98. See, e.g., id. 
 99. Id. There are some costs that must be borne by one of the three entities. For example, 
the administrative costs of retrieving the pre-clinical data for the drug are solely within the 
purview of the pharmaceutical company. Likewise, the administrative costs of soliciting, 
receiving, and analyzing Repurposing Project proposals would fall to the NIH.  
 100. See, e.g., Janssen CRA, supra note 89, § 8.1. 
 101. See id. § 8.2. 
 102. See Burroughs Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1228 (1994). Based on the oversight 
capabilities of the PAC and the collaborative nature of drafting the Project Plan, it is most likely 
that the researcher and a company scientist will be co-inventors. Because conception, rather 
than reduction to practice, is the “touchstone of inventorship,” it is of no consequence that the 
researcher will be the one who actually carries out the steps of the research that lead to the 
method-of-use patent. Id. at 1227. Each CRA contains a provision that the university will 
require its researcher to assign his/her patent rights to it. See, e.g., Pfizer CRA, supra note 89, 
§ 8.8. Thus, the company and the university will be the co-owners of any joint-patents. 
 103. See, e.g., Sanofi CRA, supra note 89, § 8.5. 
 104. For university-owned patents, see, e.g., id. § 8.4.1. For jointly-owned patents, see, 
e.g., id. § 8.6.1. Since the company intends to bring the drug to market and is facing potential 
patent litigation, it is fair to allow it to control the substance of the claims in the patent and 
where to apply for patent protection. 
 105. For university-owned patents, see, e.g., Lilly CRA, supra note 89, § 7.4.2. For jointly-
owned patents, see, e.g., Lilly CRA, supra note 89, § 7.6.1. If, in any situation, a party wishes 
to file in an additional jurisdiction, it may do so at its own expense. If the company decides it 
will stop developing the drug, it must notify the university that it is planning to let the patent 
expire. The university has sixty days to decide if it wishes to maintain the patents at its own 
expense. For university-owned patents, see, e.g., AbbVie CRA, supra note 89, § 8.4.2. For 
jointly-owned patents, see, e.g., AbbVie CRA, supra note 89, §§ 8.4.2, 8.6.5. 
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as defined in the Project Plan, the university will likely own or co-
own new patents that will need to be licensed to the company if the 
latter wishes to pursue FDA approval.
106
 The university must 
negotiate with the original company to grant-back the intellectual 
property rights it acquired during the collaboration.
107
 The company 
is given the exclusive first option to acquire a “worldwide, royalty-
bearing, exclusive or non-exclusive license, including the right to 
grant sublicenses.”108 The payment to the university will depend on 
“the relative contribution of the invention or IND relative to the 
previous investments made by the company,” as well as the 
“subsequent investments required to develop a marketed product.”109 
Three of the eight participating companies promote structuring the 
royalty payment based on a percentage of net sales of the drug 
(assuming the drug eventually makes it to market).
110
 As part of the 
standard CRA, the company will also have the exclusive first option 
to buy the IND supporting the drug’s continued development.111 After 
the parties agree on terms of the license, the company will use 
“commercially reasonable efforts” to bring the drug to market.112 
 
 106. Even if further commercial development is not pursued, both parties agree to grant a 
free license to the other for internal research purposes only. For-profit activities are strictly 
prohibited under these non-commercial licenses. See, e.g., AstraZeneca CRA, supra note 89, 
§§ 9.1.1 (university to company), 9.1.2 (company to university). 
 107. See, e.g., Bristol CRA, supra note 89, § 9.2.1. 
 108. See, e.g., id. The Lilly CRA, however, does not promise that the license will be 
royalty-bearing. Instead, the financial terms will be “commercially reasonable.” Lilly CRA, 
supra note 89, § 2.5. The NIH previously recommended using non-exclusive licenses as a 
means to ensure broader use of the patented technologies. However, it acknowledged that “[t]he 
determination of when patent protection and exclusive licensing is necessary derives from the 
specific fact situation attendant the nature of the invention and its market.” Best Practices for 
the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 18413, 18413 (Apr. 11, 2005). 
 109. Only four of the eight companies incorporated this language into their CRA: AbbVie, 
AstraZeneca, Bristol, and Janssen. See, e.g., Bristol CRA, supra note 89, § 9.2.2. The other four 
companies use more vague terms such as “commercially reasonable” or “mutually agreeable.” 
See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline CRA, supra note 89, § 2.5.  
 110. See, e.g., Bristol CRA, supra note 89, § 9.2.2 (“[T]erms shall specifically include, but 
will not be limited to . . . [percentage of net sales].”). All other companies state that the 
financial terms will be “commercially reasonable” or “mutually agreeable,” leaving open the 
possibility that the royalty will be based on net sales, up front royalties, or a combination of the 
two. See, e.g., Janssen CRA, supra note 89, § 9.3.1. 
 111. See, e.g., Sanofi CRA, supra note 89, § 9.2.1. 
 112. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.2.3, 9.3.1. 
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The two parties have six months to negotiate in good faith the 
terms of the grant-back license,
113
 at which point the discussions will 
be submitted to a non-binding arbitration proceeding.
114
 If the two 
parties cannot reach an agreement, the company maintains its 
ownership rights in joint-inventions.
115
 The university will be able to 
license its rights in joint-inventions to another pharmaceutical 
company without the project company’s permission,116 provided the 
terms offered to the third party are no better than the terms offered to 
the original company.
117
 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REPURPOSING PROJECT AND THE CRAS 
A. NCATS and the Repurposing Project are Sound Solutions  
to the Policy Concerns of the Valley of Death 
The NCATS Repurposing Project unites the three key players in 
biomedical research and development: pharmaceutical companies, 
university researchers, and the NIH. Each of these entities makes a 
unique contribution to the Project. Pharmaceutical companies bring 
knowledge about how to make and use the drug, previous preclinical 
data about the pharmacokinetics and toxicity of the drug, and the 
drug itself. University researchers contribute knowledge of the 
disease target and the manpower to conduct the repurposing research. 
The NIH has the unique skill of uniting pharmaceutical companies 
and researchers on a nationwide scale, and it also provides funding 
for the research. Moreover, the NIH can use its national peer-review 
process to filter the most promising repurposing proposals. By 
aligning these three entities, the Repurposing Project creates a triune 
 
 113. See, e.g., id. § 9.2.3.  
 114. See, e.g., AstraZeneca CRA, supra note 89, § 9.2.3. AbbVie and Sanofi did not 
include an arbitration clause. See generally AbbVie CRA, supra note 89; Sanofi CRA, supra 
note 89. 
 115. See, e.g., Janssen CRA, supra note 89, § 8.6.5; see Lilly CRA, supra note 5789, 
§ 7.64; see GlaxoSmithKline CRA, supra note 89, § 8.6.4; Pfizer CRA, supra note 89, § 8.6.4; 
Sanofi CRA, supra note 89, § 8.6.4. 
 116. See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline CRA, supra note 89, § 8.6.2. 
 117. See, e.g., id. § 9.2.4. Lilly, Pfizer, and Sanofi do not place this restriction on their 
university collaborators. See generally, e.g., Lilly CRA, supra note 89. 
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synergy that maximizes the probability of successfully repurposing a 
drug. 
Criticism of the Repurposing Project comes in two major forms. 
The first argument is that the NIH has improvidently become a drug 
developer. Under this theory, the Repurposing Project is doomed to 
fail, because the pharmaceutical companies have already repurposed 
the drugs that will successfully attain FDA approval, and only the 
dregs are being thrown to NCATS.
118
 This argument assumes two 
points: that accurate predictions can be made about a drug’s potential 
for success, and that pharmaceutical companies are the best entities to 
make those predictions. Both assumptions are wrong.  
The history of the pharmaceutical industry is replete with 
unexpected failures and long-shot success stories.
119
 At least twenty-
five drugs have been successfully repurposed.
120
 If a drug has been 
re-purposed, that necessarily means that a pharmaceutical company 
made an incorrect decision about how the drug initially should have 
been developed. As to the second assumption (that pharmaceutical 
companies are the best entity to predict a drug’s future success), the 
state of the industry speaks for itself. The old paradigm, in which 
pharmaceutical companies shouldered sole responsibility for deciding 
which compounds to develop for FDA approval, led to a logarithmic 
decrease in the efficiency of biomedical research.
121
 Instead of 
 
 118. See, e.g., John LaMattina, The NIH Is Going to Discover Drugs . . . Really?, FORBES, 
May 15, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2012/05/15/the-nih-is-
going-to-discover-drugs-really/. Dr. LaMattina, echoing the sentiment of Dr. Roy Vagelos, both 
former executives in big pharmaceutical companies, asked, “Does anyone in the audience 
believe that there is something that NCATS is going to do that the industry thinks is critical and 
that they are not doing? That is incredible to think that. If you believe that you believe in 
fairies.” Id. 
 119. The high failure rate of Phase II clinical trials (the trials in which the efficacy of the 
drug is first tested) proves the limitations in the predictive power of the current preclinical 
development paradigm. See, e.g., Marion de Jong & Theodosia Maina, Of Mice and Humans: 
Are They the Same?— Implications in Cancer Translational Research, 51 J. NUCL. MED. 501, 
501 (2010) (“Differences in size and physiology, as well as variations in the homology of 
targets between mice and humans, may lead to translational limitations.”); Hugo Geerts, Of 
Mice and Men: Bridging the Translational Disconnect in CNS Drug Discovery, 23 CNS DRUGS 
915, 915 (2009) (“While animal models have been very useful in documenting the possible 
pathological mechanisms in many CNS diseases, they are not very predictive in the area of drug 
development.”). 
 120. See CASE STUDIES, supra note 73. 
 121. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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sequestering universities to basic scientific research and 
pharmaceutical companies to downstream development, their 
overlapping expertise should be used synergistically. That is exactly 
what the Repurposing Project is structured to accomplish.
122
 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry has already signaled that it 
could use the help of university researchers in repurposing drugs. By 
2011, several large pharmaceutical companies had begun repurposing 
collaborations with a single university.
123
 Making drug repurposing a 
national endeavor allows bridges to be built between all universities 
and all pharmaceutical companies.
124
 Indeed, the popularity of the 
Repurposing Project has exploded with “deluge[s] [of] inquiries from 
companies large and small offering their compounds.”125 The 
research community has responded with a similar level of interest, as 
university researchers submitted approximately 160 preliminary 
project proposals, covering almost every one of the fifty-eight drugs 
involved in the project.
126
 
The second major criticism of the Repurposing Project is that the 
NIH should be devoting its scarce funds to basic research, as opposed 
to translational research.
127
 It is certainly true that, given the 
stagnation and sequestration-driven decline in appropriations, 
 
 122. Dr. Collins is cognizant that the NIH should not duplicate the efforts of industry. 
Rather, he strives for NCATS to “complement—not compete with—translational research at the 
NIH and elsewhere in the public and private sectors.” Collins, supra note 2, at 1. 
 123. See, e.g., Caroline Arbanas, Washington University, Pfizer Announce Groundbreaking 
Research Collaboration, WASH. U. IN ST. LOUIS NEWSROOM (May 17, 2010), http://news.wustl 
.edu/news/Pages/20770.aspx (Pfizer and Washington University in St. Louis); Kristin Bole, 
UCSF, Sanofi Collaborate to Find New Diabetes Cures, U. CAL. SAN FRANCISCO (Jan. 10, 
2012),    http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2012/01/11281/ucsf-sanofi-collaborate-find-new-diabetes-
cures (Sanofi and University of California in San Francisco). Additionally, pharmaceutical 
companies have struck collaborations with non-profit companies that conduct basic research. 
See, e.g., Eric Chatelain & Jean-Robert Ioset, Drug Discovery and Development for Neglected 
Diseases: the DNDi Model, 5 DRUG DESIGN, DEV. & THERAPY 175, 176 (2011) (GSK, Anacor, 
Merck, Pfizer, and Novartis collaborating with non-profit R&D group DNDi). 
 124. This nationalized collaboration was of the scope envisioned by Rai et al. See supra 
notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 125. Mullard, supra note 6, at 183. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., David Perrey, NIH NCATS Drug Repurposing, CHEM. SPACE (May 16, 
2012), http://chemicalspace.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/nih-ncats-drug-repurposing/ (“[NIH] is 
there to spur the research, the basic research, that will eventually lead to a practical impact upon 
society in the form of new treatments, new prevention, or things we can’t yet imagine.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 44:179 
 
 
budgets are tight at the NIH.
128
 Funding for the NIH has remained 
under the rate of biomedical research inflation for ten straight years, 
which has led to a 20 percent decrease in its effective funding 
power.
129
 Grant applications are awarded funding at a dismal rate of 
18 percent.
130
 The funding for NCATS and the Repurposing Project, 
however, is negligible in comparison to the NIH’s total budget. The 
NIH grants $24.7 billion annually to university researchers.
131
 By 
contrast, approximately $20 million is expected to be granted through 
the Repurposing Project each year.
132
 This constitutes less than one-
tenth of one percent of the NIH’s total spending. Allocating these 
funds to basic research would have little to no overall effect on the 
total amount devoted to the basic research sector.  
When budget constraints are tight, the most efficient therapeutic 
projects, with higher likelihoods of resulting in FDA approval, should 
receive public funding. The Repurposing Project fits that description. 
Repurposing a drug that is already bolstered by preclinical data and 
early human safety data has a higher likelihood of resulting in an 
FDA-approved drug. Basic exploratory research, even when 
successful, still has to clear the Valley of Death and navigate the 
gauntlet of clinical trials before reaching patients.
133
 Moreover, 
biomedical research occurs across the entire timeline of drug 
development, and the NIH has traditionally funded both basic and 
 
 128. At the meeting for the NIH Advisory Committee, Francis Collins stated, “These are 
trying times . . . historically difficult times. . . . The final numbers for FY 2012 are indeed 
sobering . . . and a deep source of concern.” Budget Concerns Voiced at Director’s Advisory 
Committee, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (July 8, 2011), http://nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2011/ 
07_08_2011/story3.htm. In fact, the United States decreased its total spending on biomedical 
research from 2007–2012, both in public and private expenditures. Chakma et al., supra note 
11, at 5. 
 129. Jocelyn Kaiser, A Flat Budget for NIH in 2013, SCI. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/02/a-flat-budget-for-nih-in-2013.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. This is 80 percent of the NIH’s total budget of $30.9 billion. NIH Budget, NAT’L INST. 
HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 132. Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules: A Pilot NIH-Industry 
Program, NAT’L CENT. ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL MED., at 1, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ 
research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/therapeutic-uses/funding.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2013). In its first round of funding, only $12.7 million was granted. New Therapeutic Uses 
Funding Information, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/ 
rescue-repurpose/therapeutic-uses/funding.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 133. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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applied research.
134
 Thus, it is well within NIH’s purview to fund 
research projects that have a high likelihood of translating into 
successful therapeutics for patients. The shortage of funding for basic 
research, which is a very real and pressing concern, is better solved 
by Congress increasing the NIH’s total budget, rather than 
misdirecting funds from translational research like the Repurposing 
Project. 
B. The CRAs Effectively Address Concerns about Patent Ownership 
and Allocation of Costs and Resources 
The CRAs efficiently facilitate a collaborative relationship 
between the pharmaceutical company, the university researcher, and 
the NIH. The two potential sources of friction discussed in Part III, 
above, have been effectively dealt with ex-ante in these agreements. 
The first concern, the allocation of IP ownership rights to inventions 
arising during the project, is handled by allowing the university 
researcher to retain ownership of IP if he or she conceived of the 
innovation. This is consistent with current patent law. At the 
conclusion of the Project, the university will either sell those IP rights 
back to the original company or to a third party. In either case, the 
university is rewarded financially for its innovative contribution. 
The second concern, fairly distributing risks, costs, and potential 
profits amongst the participants, is also effectively addressed and 
evenly balanced in the Project. In terms of cost, each party is 
donating significant resources to the Project. The NIH granted $12.7 
million for nine projects in 2013.
135
 The university is contributing the 
manpower to conduct the research and complete the required 
regulatory procedures. The company is opening up its medicine 
cabinet to allow outsiders access to a drug that is patent-protected and 
bolstered by positive results from some previous experiments. The 
risk accompanying further development and the dispersal of potential 
 
 134. “NIH’s funding for basic research is slightly over half (54 percent) of research 
funding, and this balance between basic and applied research has remained fairly constant over 
the past decade.” FRANCIS COLLINS, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE 
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR—HHS—EDUC. APPROPRIATIONS 4–5 (Mar. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.nih.gov/about/director/budgetrequest/fy2013_testimony_house.pdf. 
 135. NIH to Fund Collaborations, supra note 6. 
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rewards are contemplated in the royalty payments of the option 
license. The promise that payments to the university will consider 
“the relative contribution of the invention or IND relative to the 
previous investments made by the company” and the “subsequent 
investments required to develop a marketed product” perfectly 
balances the costs, risks, and rewards to the participants.
136
 
The CRAs also require the university to negotiate with the 
pharmaceutical company first if it attempts to sell any patent or IND 
originating from the Repurposing Project.
137
 This might raise antitrust 
concerns,
138
 but the terms of the CRAs are not manifestly 
anticompetitive. The CRAs do not require the pharmaceutical 
company to purchase the grant-back license. Rather, the university 
researcher merely presents the company with the option to do so. If 
these negotiations fail, then, under the terms of the CRA, the 
university researcher has the right to license the IP to a third party 
without the original company’s consent.139 Furthermore, the purpose 
of this exclusive option is to decrease the risk that a pharmaceutical 
company’s patented products and underlying trade secrets will be 
shared with outside researchers. Thus, the provision incentivizes risk-
averse companies to participate in the Repurposing Project, leading to 
collaboration and the development of therapies. Protections for 
relationship-specific investments are typically weighed by the courts 
 
 136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Although the four companies that do not 
include this specific language make vague promises to be “reasonable” or “agreeable,” supra 
note 109, they should consider using this language. It is a strong signal to potential 
collaborators and policymakers that the companies will consider the proper factors when 
negotiating the terms of the grant-back license. 
 137. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 80, at 59–62 (arguing that reach-through royalties for 
mandatory licenses of basic research tools are per se valid if the royalty payment does not 
exceed the life of the underlying patent). The antitrust concerns discussed by Mueller are even 
less relevant in this context, because the underlying patent involves a product that is further 
downstream in the development process. Mueller, as well as several other commentators on 
biomedical research policy, focuses on issues arising from the fact that patents protecting basic 
research tools may stifle innovation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Rai 
& Eisenberg, supra note 60. While their concerns are relevant to those situations, they do not 
apply to the Repurposing Project, where the patents at issue are much further downstream as 
they involve a drug or a method of using a drug to treat a disease. 
 139. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
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in determining if a business practice is unfairly anticompetitive.
140
 In 
this context, the first option provision is best understood as an 
incentive to collaborate, rather than being manifestly anticompetitive. 
Thus, it does not amount to an antitrust violation.
141
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Repurposing Project pragmatically builds bridges across the 
Valley of Death. Aligning pharmaceutical companies, university 
researchers, and the NIH promotes a triune synergy unique to the 
biomedical research field. Without any one of these three entities, the 
Project would lack an important element that is necessary for its 
success. University researchers bring important knowledge about the 
new disease to be targeted. Pharmaceutical companies supply know-
how about using the drug and valuable data that can support an IND. 
The NIH provides a nationwide infrastructure for uniting researchers 
with companies and for selecting the most promising repurposing 
proposals.  
Most importantly, the launch of NCATS and the Repurposing 
Project advances the mission statement of the NIH: “to enhance 
health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability.”142 
Repurposing abandoned drugs fills an important gap in biomedical 
 
 140. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977) (holding 
sales restriction used by respondent should be judged under the traditional rule-of-reason 
standard). 
 141. A related challenge could be brought against the grant-back licenses in the 
Repurposing Project under the patent law doctrine of patent misuse. This equitable defense to 
patent infringement prohibits the patentee from “extend[ing] the economic effect beyond the 
scope of the patent grant.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
Patent misuse “requires that the alleged infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly 
broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.” 
Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The licenses in the 
Repurposing Project should survive any attack under the patent misuse doctrine. Courts 
typically give broad latitude to the terms of a license negotiated in good faith by the parties. 
See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that a 
license with reach-through royalty provisions that extended even beyond the temporal scope of 
the patent was not per se invalid because the license was not conditioned upon the acceptance 
of that term). Moreover, the terms of the grant-back licenses in the Repurposing Project are 
unlikely to be deemed anticompetitive. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 58. 
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research. Despite criticism,
143
 the pharmaceutical industry is not 
commandeering university researchers. Rather, the pharmaceutical 
industry is collaborating with researchers and paying them a 
percentage of the profits realized from a successfully developed drug. 
The Repurposing Project provides another way to conceptualize 
translational medicine—sharing capital (monetary and intellectual) 
amongst drug sellers and basic researchers. Far from overstepping its 
bounds, NCATS is a pragmatic and efficient mechanism for creating 
synergy in biomedical research to benefit human health. 
 
 143. See supra note 118. 
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